The Split Level Bridge by Hughes, Wayne P. Jr.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
DSpace Repository
Faculty and Researchers Faculty and Researchers' Publications
1962-05
The Split Level Bridge
Hughes, Wayne P. Jr.
U.S. Naval Institute
United States Naval Institute Proceedings, May 1962 Volume 88/5/68-77
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/64658
This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United
States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the
United States.
Downloaded from NPS Archive: Calhoun
Proceedings T he full rigged ship Matilda Wattenbach, British Registry, running 
in the Trades. Painting 
by M ontague Dawson. 
Reproduced by courtesy 
May, 1962 
of the Insurance Company 
of North America. 
VOLUME 88, N UMBER 5, WHOLE NO. 711 
The U. S. Naval Institute is a private, 
professional society for all who are inter-
ested in naval and maritime affairs. It is 
a self-supporting, non-profit organiza-
tion and is not a part of the U. S. Navy 
Department. 
The opinions or assertions in the articles 
are the personal ones of the authors and 
are not to be construed as official. They 
do not necessarily reflect the views of 
either the Navy Department or the 
United States Naval Institute. 
All photographs, unless otherwise cred-
ited, are Official Department of Defense 
releases. 
Editorial and Busi11ess Offices: Annapolis, 
Maryland 
Published 111011tluy by the U,ii/ed States Naval 
fostit11te . Seccnd-dass postage paid at the Post 
Office o.f MENASHA, \ VrscoNSIN, aud at addi-
tional maili,,g offi.ce, wider act of August 24, 
1912. Aaeptanc.efur ,nailing at the special rate 
of Postage Provided for ;,. section 1103, Act of 
October 3, 1917, authorized Marci, 13, 19ZZ. 
Jf tmbership d11rs for the U. S. Nasal Institute 
(including PROCEEDIKGS), $4.00 a year. 
Subscription ralt $6.00 a year . (Foreign postage, 
$1.00 txlra.) S i11gle copies fifty cents. 
Copyright© 1962 by U.S. Nasal lnstit11le 
Contrasting Strategic Styles in the Cold War (Prize 
Essay, Honorable Mention, 1962) 
By Charles 0. Lerche, Jr . 
The Paper War-Quo Vadis? 
By Lt. Cdr. J ames T. Strong, USN 
The Soviet Union Today 
By Rear Adm. 0. H. Dodson, USN (Ret.) 
The International Indian Ocean Expedition 
By E. John Long 
The Split-Level Bridge 
By Lt. Cdr. W ayne P. Hughes, USN 
Our Merchant Fleet Is in Trouble 
By Capt. E. B. Perry, USN (Ret. ) 
Planning for Sicily 
By Richard M . Leighton 
Mines-the Weapons That Wait (Pictorial). 
By L t. C. J. W ages, J r., USN 
Comment and Discussion 
Book Reviews 




A Page from the Old Navy 




















by W. P. Hughes, Jr. , 
Lieutenant Commander, 
U.S. Navy 
The captains of our ASW ships need the full picture 
of the situation made available instantly to carry 
out co-ordinated, effective, high speed attacks. 
The bridges of our destroyer types must be redesigned 
to meet this need, says the author. 
Sm artly on signal, the destroyer pivoted to clear the screen, heeled steeply as the seas 
struck her beam, and swung her bow into the 
wind and waves. Somewhere ahead an Amer-
ican submarine had been spotted by an Amer-
ican VP aircraft, and for drill , the destroyer 
was on the wa y to hunt her down. The moon-
less, overcast sky clamped a cloak of darkness 
over the bridge, making whitecaps hardly 
more than ghostly images fleeting by. Slash-
ing February rain, almost sleet, obscured the 
d immed sidelights and red trucks of two 
other ships of the Surface Attack Unit- the 
meager luxury of peacetime operations. 
The destroyer swayed and shuddered as 
she gathered speed . The wind blew a modest 
20 knots and the seas rose moderately to six 
feet, but on this heading- exactly where a 
smart sub would go to slip away in hard 
weather-a 40-knot gale swept the bridge, 
and the diving bow scooped up great sheets of 
water to be lashed back instantly at the 
bridge. The lookouts wiped the biting salt-
water from their eyes with mittened hands, 
their wet binoculars dangling useless in front 
of them. 
In a detached way, the Captain admired 
the wisdom of a task group commander who 
would test his destroyers in weather all too 
common, but generally regarded as too much 
of a challenge, too much of a burden on 
young crews and old ships. But he could not 
help trembling within at the danger. 
The wind demolished the quiet of the 
bridge. A tactical signal from the Surface 
Attack Unit (SAU) Commander was lost in 
the din of awning cracking overhead, crash of 
spray against bulwarks, and whine of wind. 
The phone talker relayed the signal, but the 
feeble link with Combat Information Center 
(CIC) had failed somewhere-the course was 
70 degrees off what it ought to have been. 
The Captain endured 30 agonizing seconds 
as the signal was repeated. The Junior 
Officer of the Watch fumbled for the UCO 
( umerical Identification) code and found 
it on the table inside the pilot house, safely 
but inaccessibly out of the weather. While he 
flashed his dim red light on the code, the 
Combat Information Center (CIC) came to 
the rescue, quickly now over the 21MC voice 
circuit, with the right course, and seconds 
later, the way to station on the beam of the 
guide. 
The Officer of the Deck wiped a sheet of 
water from the radar repea ter, estimated the 
probable courses of the specks representing the 
rest of the SAU, calculated that Combat's 
recommendation was good, and took it. The 
Junior Officer of the Deck gave up the hope-
less task of confirming CIC's course with a 
cold-hardened grease pencil on the wet plastic 
covering his maneuvering board. Salt water 
made simple tasks impossible. It coated the 
windshield and, trickling behind, beaded the 
whole of the open bridge. Water sloshed be-
neath the grating underfoot. It coated binocu-
lars. It threatened to turn tactical publica-
tions into pulp. It exaggerated the bite of the 
cold, stinging face and freezing hands. 
The OOD squeezed by the JO to the in-
board wing of the bridge, to stare into the 
inky blackness. He tripped over the talker 's 
phone wire, and the roll of the ship hurled 
him against the bulwark. The cramped space, 
the sway of the ship, the bulky clothing, made 
his movement as difficult as a fullback's into 
an eight-man line. 
The Captain took heart in his own vast sub-
hunting experience. He knew the next signal 
even before he heard it, and its meaning with-
out struggling with the signal book at arm's 
reach, yet figuratively almost beyond grasp 
in this weather. He knew his team was able 
and experienced. There would be no asking 
for repeats by the JOOW now on the lJS 
phones. Combat would be tracking every ship 
in the area, would have datum pin-pointed, 
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would calculate the sub's possible and prob-
able reactions, either to fight back or slip 
quietly away. 
But the missing bits of information: Where 
were the rest of the SAU? Where was datum? 
What with certainty was track spacing? Time 
late? Search plan? Aircraft at datum? He 
damned the dark, the din, the wet, the cold, 
the tight-packed open bridge, which blind-
folded and muffied him from his information. 
It had been barely five minutes since his 
ship had left formation. Hours of arduous 
maneuver lay ahead-·a high-speed approach; 
sonar contact on a submarine (one day there 
might be a team of submarines) that could 
fight back from a vantage point in which toss-
ing seas above were in its favor; the spiit-
second decisions of attack and reattack de-
manding split second, unerring information. 
Could a captain with a team less skilled do 
more than struggle to survive? Could a cap-
tain as SAU Commander with the hottest 
antisubmarine warfare team in the world be 
able tofight the submarine, not the weather in such 
turmoil? 
* * * 
On a typical destroyer bridge under such 
moderate weather conditions, a commanding 
officer is almost helpless. The conduct of the 
A/ S search or attack devolves on his assistants 
in CIC or Underwater Battery Plot, and he 
becomes hardly more than a safety observer. 
Putting it conservatively, these conditions will 
be rather common in wartime, yet any com-
manding officer shudders or, at best, offers a 
wry smile at the thought of bounding after a 
datum and careening through multi-ship at-
tacks in 25-knot winds and 8-foot seas. Peace-
time interest has centered more on ship's 
safety than on an "enemy" under the surface. 
The captain's sources of information are 
choked off in one way or another so that, first, 
he must exert extraordinary effort just to pre-
serve his ship, and second, his tactical deci-
sions must be based on less than the informa-
tion he needs, information which most frus-
tratingly is in the ship but cannot be given to 
him. 
Even under the best weather conditions, 
and with an ideally trained crew, the captain 
lacks important tactical data. He cannot 
know as quickly as the ASW Officer in Under-
water Battery Plot the instantaneous course 
and speed of the enemy. For this reason, Plot 
conducts the attack. The captain cannot know 
as well as CIC does by its Dead Reckoning 
Tracer track that the enemy is backing down, 
that he likes to turn in or away at the moment 
of attack, that he has opened the throttle to 
break free through a gap in the destroyers, or 
that he is twisting to offer sonar a fat knuckle 
to ping on. In short, the captain needs to know 
what the sub's skipper has been doing, in 
order to help evaluate what he will do next. 
Furthermore, the pace has quickened. By the 
time word reaches the commanding officer, 
the situation may be changed. Non-concur-
rence of sonar contacts may change to a con-
currence, in the time lag while the word is be-
ing passed from the Communication Informa-
tion net talker to evaluator to JOOW to cap-
tain, wasting precious seconds and opening 
the way to confusion and a needless shadow 
of doubt in the Captain's mind. At darken 
ship and no moon, even the one big a_dvan-
tage of knowing his consort's movements in-
st~ntaneously, by looking-even this in-
formation is gone. 
In ASW, does the captain belong on the 
bridge all the time? Any of the time? There is 
a long naval history of command control and 
ship control being at the same station. The 
Richard Mowrey 
New bridge design of the DDG-2 class combines 
the pilothouse and open bridge into one enclosed 
area. Shown is USS Sampson (DDG-10). The chart 
table is on the starboard wing of the bridge. 
Richard Mowrey 
BuShips says that hundreds of Fleet officers were consulted on 
the design of the DDG-2 class bridge. This design is still 
not right, the author argues. Here, the bridge of USS Sampson 
is a calml scene as she rips along at Bank speed. 
two have seemed to belong together for so 
long that we naval officers tend to forget 
there is a distinction. Further fuzzing the dis-
tinction is the fact that, whether it is right or 
not, in peacetime ship control takes prece-
dence over all other functions of command 
control. Collision is a genuine hazard; the 
enemy is just for drill. Ship control keeps the 
captain on the bridge and since he must-or 
feels he must-be there, command control is 
there, too. 
In wartime, the risk of a subordinate mis-
managing ship control must be weighed 
against the possible advantages of achieving 
better command control with the captain at 
another station. Truthfully, we haven't 
weighed the pros and cons of putting com-
mand control elsewhere because we haven't 
the courage to take the captain off the bridge. 
I submit that we had better start experimenting. 
Particularly in the case of guided missile war-
ships, it seems logical to me to pu·t the captain 
in CIC where combat control goes on-
where important final decisions are made. I 
further submit that for obvious reasons the 
only way to get him off the bridge in the 
peacetime environment of safety first will be 
to order him off. 
I believe that, under the right conditions 
as they may be determined, the risk should be 
taken and the captain ordered to the place 
where command control should be-virtually 
is in fact-such as CIC in USS Charles F. 
Adams (DDG-2) . (Note: As long ago as 1956, 
the modular CIC was referred to as "Com-
bat Direction Center spaces" in CinCLanFlt 
Instruction 09020.1. OPNA V Instruction 
09020.3 states that in the modular CIC, "An 
important feature is the physical separation 
of decision making from information gathering 
and action stations" (italics mine). Consider 
the titles of these modular CIC spaces: Sur-
face Operations Control, Air Warfare Control, 
,veapons Direction, Atomic Direction, etc. The 
heart of the modular CIC is labeled the "Dis-
play D ecision Area.") 
Should the commanding officer be in CIC 
for ASW? The British and Canadian navies 
made it so, by directing that the captain be 
there. He is in CIC because they feel he can 
best secure all available tactical information 
there, and therefore best exercise command 
control-or combat direction, as I would 
rather call it. The British and Canadians con-
tend that any good OOD can exercise ship 
control, that is, direct the ship where it must 
go. The direction and speed a ship takes is 
semi-automatic and involves a minimum of 
decision- merely putting the ship where the 
Officer in Tactical Control (OTC) or SAU 
commander orders it, or taking the prescribed 
action of the GTMO circle (a dual ship at-
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tack on a submarine), or Duet Plan, or Spiral 
Search. Our allies feel that any well qualified 
OOD can avoid a collision with a ship or anti-
sub helicopter and knows which way to turn 
if he sees a torpedo coming. 
The same conditions, however, do not ob-
tain in the U. S. Navy. Unfortunately, our 
DRT's are not equipped like theirs for auto-
matic display of consort and submarine tar-
get. Usually our CIC's are removed from the 
vicinity of the bridge so that our captains can-
not hedge, as our fellow Anglo-Saxons can, by 
stepping out onto the bridge when CIC gets 
lost, as it does sometimes. There is a shadow 
of doubt, practically speaking, as to whether 
the relatively junior OOD's in U. S. destroy-
ers today really can exercise due prudence in 
ship control without the advice of the captain. 
Finally, concerning collision, the British 
accept a minor scrape, speaking literally and 
figuratively, as something that happens to 
daring, aggressive officers. In our Navy, the 
conservatism that develops in large organiza-
tions has bred the notion in the Fleet that any 
collision leaves a mark black enough in a cap-
tain's record that he had best immediately 
look into the future of chicken farming. 
The conclusion seems to be, then, that until 
attitudes change and CIC facilities improve, 
the captain will remain on the bridge for 
ASW. But if the captain cannot go to his com-
bat information, then combat information 
can be brought to him, more unerringly than 
via a sound-powered phone talker. It can be 
done by adding a few facilities to a better de-
signed bridge, and by putting CIC and Sonar 
close by to allow the captain to look there and 
perhaps eventually to stay there. 
In recent years, the Navy has moved in 
this direction. Our ASW ships' bridges have 
been fitted with remote sonar bearing and 
range indicators, 29 Mc voice circuits, and 
course-to-steer indicators. A 61JS talker plot-
ting data direct from sonar helped, as did a 
1JS talker. Open bridges have been better 
weather protected. Windshields and awnings 
were made tighter. It is becoming common to 
see plywood or aluminum roofs mounted over 
the open bridge and waterproof windshields 
to reduce noise and water. All these were 
makeshift postwar efforts, imaginative, in-
genious, born of need to provide combat in-
formation more efficiently to the combat di-
rection center. They were also penny-wise, 
but this was not the fault of destroyer officers, 
who took the best they could get. 
In the Fletcher-class destroyer escort con-
versions, the CIC is located right aft of the 
pilot house, half a deck down. Why was the 
destroyer CIC separated from the bridge 
to begin with? First, it grew up around the 
radar set, which, because it was heavy and 
valuable, was best buried low in the ship. 
Second, vital CIC in large combatant ships 
was located beneath the security of the ar-
mored deck. Third, tradition wisely removed 
the second senior officer from the captain's 
vicinity so that both would not perish in bat-
tle at once. Finally, it was entirely feasible to 
fight a battleship after primary conn was 
wiped out, in which case secondary conn 
would continue to need combat information 
from CIC. 
Initially the same logic was illogically ap-
plied to destroyers, and CIC combat informa-
tion was removed just far enough to make 
communications with the bridge combat di-
rection laborious. (This despite the fact the 
unit commander's plot behind the pilot house 
put the ship's two senior officers side by side.) 
The location was satisfactory at th~ pace of 
200-knot bombers and 8-knot submarines, but 
is collapsing today. Weighed against the ad-
vantages of having almost all modern combat 
information quickly available at the combat 
direction center, the disadvantages seem pal-
try A destroyer with its bridge knocked out 
is hors de combat for ASW, anyway. Nor has it 
a battleship's protective decks; on the con-
trary, in a destroyer, CIC security against the 
biggest threat, the torpedo, increases with alti-
tude. 
Our newest destroyer types reflect these 
facts. In the Charles F. Adams, Coontz, and 
Richard M owrey 
USS McCajjrey (DDE-860) is a converted Gearing-class de-
stroyer. Her bridge is not designed to supply vital information 
to the captain most effectively and swiftly, according to the 
author. 
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Proposed ASW Destroyer Bridge/Command Center 
PLOTTING TABLE 
I 











Bainbridge classes, CIC is directly aft of the 
pilot house. In Norfolk, the present command-
ing officer stations his CIC personnel in com-
mand plot behind the pilot house, even 
though its facilities are older and less com-
plete than in the designed CIC (the captain's 
sea cabin, incidentally, opens into his CIC). 
In Adams and Dewey, combat direction fa-
cilities on the bridge (from an ASW stand-
point) approach the ideal: ample space in a 
weather-tight pilot house with CIC directly 
STATU S BOARD 
TACTICAL CONSOLE 
GYRO REPEATER 61) 
behind, moderately good visibility, an MK78 
target indicator, and other key tactical in-
formation displays. Their major weakness is 
poor visibility toward the quarter and astern, 
and the very spaciousness of the bridge which 
causes the conning officer to run from side to 
side in any kind of maneuvering. The rectan-
gular windows are small enough to cramp 
vision and especially bearing-taking from the 
pilot house gyro repeater. These are serious 
weaknesses in formation steaming and, in my 
mind, constitute a fatal flaw in any kind of 
close ASW work. A conning station, with all-
round visibility in fair weather, is needed. 
The past offers wisdom for the present. The 
first U. S. steam-powered vessels had com-
pletely open bridges . About the turn of the 
century, in the day of torpedo boat destroyers 
and World War I flush-deckers, bulwarks and 
windows were added for wind and water pro-
tection, but the bridges remained open and 
DuPont (DD-941) (Not to scale) 
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breezy. Then postwar destroyers of the early 
1930's had enclosed pilot houses and bridge 
wings, with fairly large rectangular windows. 
But the Sims-class of the late 1930's and later 
classes had round ports, which apparently had 
such poor visibility that designs were modified 
to provide an open bridge forward for better 
visibili ty in fair weather. 
The open bridge soon became the OOD's 
only conning station. Over the years, awnings 
AN I SPS-4 
TACTI CAL CO NSOLE PLOTTING TABLE 
~~~~i:;;r~~:::;~-c-- POSITION INDICATOR FOR 





The open bridge of DttPont was weatherproofed to the extent of funds 
available during overhaul, winter 1960-61. The overhead and wings are 





1. Rectangular high strength 
windows. 
2. Weather-tight conning station. 
3. Three tables. 
GYRO REPEATER 
TARGET POSITION INDICATOR 
PLOTTING TABLE 
AN / SPS-4B REPEATER 
GYRO REPEATER 
W' eaknesses 
1. Windows too small; limited 
visibility when using gyro 
repeater. 
2. Wheel, etc. too far forward. 
3. Status board location bad. 
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and windshields were added for protection. 
By the time Norfolk and the Forrest Sherman's 
were built, the windshields and awnings were 
semi-permanent; the resolution of the visibil-
ity vs. protection problem had returned full 
circle to the answer of the flush-deckers. Now 
the cycle has started its second time around 
in the latest DDG's and DLG's which have a 
spacious pilot house, large but similar to the 
destroyer pilot house of the early 1930's: com-
pare the face of Mahan's conning station 
(1933) with Dewey's (1960). But this pilot 
house still does not afford the visibility so 
often desirable in fair weather. 
To recapitulate then, the ideal destroyer 
ASW combat direction station needs the fol-
lowing: 
(1) For practical reasons (at present) a 
combined ship control and ASW combat 
direction (command control) station. It is an 
all-weather station containing the best possi-
ble combat information facilities. It has ade-
quate plotting facilities, status boards, inter-
and intra-ship communications, piloting fa-
cilities (probably including the fathometer) 
and the underwater telephone. It is sound-
proofed and as quiet as possible. It has ample 
room, but is carefully arranged to minimize 
movement. The importance of all-around vis-
ibility is recognized. 
(2) A CIC in an adj acent compartment to 
afford the commanding officer ready access to 
tactical details while keeping its noise and 
occasional pandemonium off the bridge. 
Sonar consoles and the attack director are in 
a compartment alongside CIC. The chart-
house and sea cabin are nearby. It is envi-
sioned that as CIC's are better equipped for 
ASW and the situation permits, the com-
manding officer will spend more and more 
time in CIC and Sonar. 
(3) An immediately accessible fair weather 
station with maximum view to exercise both 
combat direction and ship control when visi-
bili~y is particularly valuable, as during ASW 
operations at close quarters, piloting, and 
stationing in fair weather, as well as replenish-
ment at sea. It would also serve as a lookout 
station, visual ASW air control station, and 
could serve as a signal bridge. 
* * * 
One design to fulfill these requirements 
would have an enclosed pilothouse with an 
open bridge behind and a half deck up, and 
CIC, sonar, charthouse, and the sea cabin 
behind and a half deck down. There would 
be relatively small wings on either side of the 
pilothouse. 
It is not within the scope of this paper to 
detail each station. Mentioning certain facil-
ities, however, will help clarify the function 
of each. The all-weather bridge contains ASW 
tactical console, Mk 78 ASW target indicator, 
and AN/ SPA-8 radar remote repeater near 
the captain's station. The radar repeater 
would be used in the dead reckoning analysis 
operation in low visibility for the most rapid 
information on consort courses. Three over-
head speakers are well aft, on the pilothouse 
overhead. There is a large plotting table at 
the front of the pilothouse for maneuvering 
board solutions, and a status board for voice 
calls, engineering plant status, guardships, 
etc., on the forward bulkhead. Large, ballisti-
cally strong windshields are all around, sloped 
forward at the top to eliminate reflection, 
tinted, and with internal heating for de-icing. 
Windshield wipers are mounted, and a fresh 
water spray flushes off salt water. About every 
third windshield rolls down. Quartermaster's 
and navigator's tables are provided. An 
AN/ SPA-4 radar repeater in addition to the 
AN/ SPA-8 is desirable. The underwater tele-
phone is here. The space is air-conditioned. 
The open bridge would have venturi wind 
screens forward and on the sides. I do not be-
lieve plastic windshields are necessary or de-
sirable. Sliding panels forward and amidships 
would lower to allow the conning officer to 
give orders directly to the steersman and allow 
officers there to hear the tactical circuit 
speakers mounted just forward on the pilot-
house overhead. There would be a hooded 
plotting table, and a captain's ASW console 
duplicating the one in the pilothouse, and 
nearby radio phone units. An air controller 
console has inter- and intra-ship communica-
tions facilities. If the signal bridge is on this 
level, there is a protected room or booth for 
publications and message files. There are two 
lookout stations. Small extensions on either 
side afford positions for conning alongside. 
There is no radar repeater. 
The main reason plastic windshields and a 
radar repeater (minimum cost $8,000) are 
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omitted is a conscious effort to prevent history 
from repeating itself and the open bridge from 
becoming again the OOD's conning station 
in all weather with the addition of wind-
shields, awning, and so forth. Ship control is 
to remain under normal conditions in the 
pilothouse. 
Al though the arrangement as a whole is 
unique, no single feature is new. The facilities, 
such as radar repeater with dead reckoning 
analysis input and target indicator, exist. The 
conning station behind the steersman, split-
level fashion, has been employed in U. S. 
destroyers and is common in foreign navies, 
notably the British. The CIC and sonar loca-
tion near the conning station now has ample 
precedent and is very similar to the Canadian 
St. Laurent-class, our FRAM conversions, and 
Dealiry-class destroyers. 
Lest the criticism be levied that there will 
be too much weight high in the ship for good 
stability, or that if the bridge is lowered it will 
take too much water, I hasten to point out 
that our newer destroyer types, the St. 
Laurent-class, and even our Fletcher-class de-
stroyer escort conversion demonstrate that 
this need not be a problem. Modern hull de-
sign will contribute much to keeping the 
bridge level dry. If it is recognized that these 
combat direction facilities are sine qua non in a 
successful ASW design, then they will receive 
* 
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a priority consideration sufficient to ensure 
that they are located as they should be. 
For there are no needs quite like those of 
ASW ships. In sailing ships, maneuvers were 
so slow that no special conning station was 
necessary: Nelson was two hours under fire 
closing Villeneuve at Trafalgar. In the 20th 
century battle line, a well armored gun plat-
form was the most important design consid-
eration. In the aircraft carrier, design cen-
tered -around the most effective flight plat-
form. It might be said that in minesweeping, 
design centers around the fantail and mine-
sweeping gear; in the service force, around 
carrying capacity; in anti-air warships, 
around early and rapid target acquisition; in 
amphibious craft, around ability to launch 
the maximum landing force rapidly. But in 
ASW, weight and space for the killing weap-
ons are relatively unimportant; carrying ca-
pacity and armor are minor. Though sonar 
detection is fundamental, co-equally impor-
tant is ability to use the sonar information 
quickly and effectively in co-ordinated high 
speed attack at close quarters, a need which 
has no counterpart in any other operation. 
Failure to modify the bridges in the FRAM 
II conversions at a relatively small expense 
connotes to me a failure outside of operational 
circles to appreciate that weapons and weap-
ons direction systems must be complemented 
by command decision facilities. 
Every indication is that lengthy, deliberate 
attacks are tactics of the past. High speed sub-
marines and long range weapons of great 
destructive power in both surface ships and 
submarines portend very rapid , very conclu-
sive action. If the captain is to remain on the 
bridge, for the time being at least, then bridge 
location and design is of first importance. 
Whether his facilities are best configured like 
an aircraft cockpit or Northampton's CIC, let 
them be his. Success in the ASW mission will 
depend as in no other on his nerve center of 
tactical decision. The captain must be in com-
mand. 
Superiority of material strength is given to a commander gratis. Superior knowledge 
and superior tactical skill he must himself acquire. Superior morale, superior co-opera-
tion, he must himself create. 
Admiral Joseph M. Reeves, U. S. Navy. 
